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Abstract—In this work, two practical concepts related to
private information retrieval (PIR) are introduced and coined
symbol-separated PIR and strongly linear PIR. Being symbol-
separated is a sufficient condition for being strongly linear, and
strong linearity enables implementation over small finite fields
with low sub-packetization degree.
Then, the capacity of MDS-coded, linear, symbol-separated
PIR in the presence of colluding servers is derived, as well as the
capacity of symmetric, linear PIR with colluding, adversarial,
and nonresponsive servers for the recently introduced concept
of matched randomness. This positively settles the capacity
conjectures stated by Freij-Hollanti et al. and Tajeddine et al.
in the presented cases. It is also shown that, further restricting
to strongly-linear PIR schemes with deterministic linear interfer-
ence cancellation, the so-called star product scheme proposed by
Freij-Hollanti et al. is essentially optimal and induces no capacity
loss.
I. INTRODUCTION
User privacy has increased its importance together with
the increasing usage of distributed services such as cloud
storage and various peer-to-peer networks. Recently, private
information retrieval (PIR) in the context of coded storage has
gained a lot of interest. With PIR, a user is able to download
a desired file from a database or distributed storage system
without revealing the identity of the file to the servers. Several
PIR capacity results have been derived in various scenarios,
e.g., for replicated [2] and maximum distance separable (MDS)
coded [3] storage, colluding servers [4], single-server PIR with
side information [5], [6], and symmetric PIR (SPIR) [7]–
[9]. Symmetric refers to the property that the user is only
able to decode the file that she has requested, and learns
nothing about the other files. We will denote nonsymmet-
ric/symmetric PIR with t-collusion by TPIR/TSPIR and with
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The results related to symmetric PIR and strongly linear PIR were presented
at the 2019 IEEE Information Theory Workshop [1]. The results concerning
symbol-separated PIR capacity are new, and more proofs are added with
respect to [1].
additional b Byzantine (and possibly r non-responsive) servers
by TBPIR/TBSPIR, respectively. It has also been shown that
the MDS property is not necessary for achieving the MDS–
PIR capacity [10], [11].
In this paper, we close some gaps in the capacity results.
First, we will prove Conjecture 1 in [12] for MDS-coded,
linear, symbol-separated PIR with colluding servers. After this,
we will develop the concept of a strongly-linear PIR scheme,
and prove the capacity of strongly-linear (non-symmetric)
PIR schemes for any number of files m. This also yields a
proof in this practical special case for the conjecture stated in
the asymptotic regime (m → ∞) in [13, Conj. 1]. Finally,
we prove Conjecture 2 in [13] for linear, symmetric PIR
with coded, colluding, and adversarial servers for the case of
matched randomness as introduced in [14] (see Section VI for
a rigorous definition). We restate the conjectures later in this
section for the ease of reading and numbering.
The main contribution of this paper is the proof for the
capacity of MDS-coded, linear, symbol-separated PIR with
coded and colluding servers. The converse (upper bound) is
given by Theorem 1, and an achievable scheme can be found
by combining [12] and [15, Thm. 3], where a lift operation is
introduced, which together with the star product scheme [12]
achieves the derived capacity upper bound. While the seem-
ingly technical assumption of symbol separation (cf. Def. 2)
is unnecessary from the point of view of proving a general
capacity result, we demonstrate its practical relevance in two
important regards. Firstly, all general schemes in the literature
that are defined for wide ranges of parameters are indeed
symbol separated. Secondly, symbol separation is a necessary
condition for strong linearity. Strong linearity enables practical
implementation, as it allows for a field size that is linear in the
number of servers and a subpacketization that is quadratic in
the number of servers, independently of the number of files.
See Remark 2 for discussion.
Nonrigorously, the rate of a PIR scheme with m files is
denoted and defined as
Rm =
size of the desired file
size of the total download
.
We denote by Cm the capacity, i.e., the largest achievable rate
of a PIR scheme for m files under some given constraints. A
scheme that downloads from a variable number of files has
2asymptotic rate
R := lim
m→∞
Rm ,
and is called asymptotically capacity achieving if
R = lim
m→∞
Cm.
In Table I, we summarize the known asymptotic capacity
results relevant to this paper, as well as show the conjectured
results [12], [13] in red. We give a precise problem setup as
well as more rigorous definitions for the rate and capacity later
in Section II.
(n, k) MDS-coded PIR Ref.
1− k+t+2b+r−1
n
[13]
b,r=0 1− k+t−1
n
[12]
k=1,r=0 1− t+2b
n
[16]
t=1,b=r=0 1− k
n
[3]
k=1,b=r=0 1− t
n
[4]
TABLE I
ASYMPTOTIC CAPACITY RESULTS AND CONJECTURES (IN RED). THE
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF COLLUDING / BYZANTINE / NONRESPONSIVE
SERVERS IS DENOTED BY t, b, r RESPECTIVELY.
Notation: Throughout the paper, we denote a finite field
of q elements by Fq or shortly F. We write [n] for the set
of integers {i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. A code over Fq mapping k
information symbols to n encoded symbols with minimum
distance d is denoted by (n, k, d). Here, the length n can
also be thought of as the number of servers in the storage
system. Maximum distance separable (MDS) codes satisfying
the Singleton bound with equality, i.e., d = n − k + 1, are
denoted by (n, k). Linear codes are respectively denoted by
[n, k, d] and [n, k]. The results in this paper hold for general
(n, k) MDS codes, i.e., we do not make the assumption of
linearity for the codes.
A. Conjectures and contributions
Let us now assume n > k + t + 2b + r − 1, where t, b, r
refer to the number of colluding, Byzantine, and nonresponsive
servers, respectively.
Conjecture 1 ( [13], Conjecture 1). The asymptotic capacity
(as m → ∞) of PIR from an (n, k) MDS storage code with
t-collusion, b Byzantine servers, and r nonresponsive servers
is
1−
k + t+ 2b+ r − 1
n
.
Conjecture 2 ( [13], Conjecture 2). The capacity of SPIR
from an (n, k) MDS storage code with t-collusion, b Byzantine
servers, and r nonresponsive servers is
1−
k + t+ 2b+ r − 1
n
.
Remark 1. In the original version of the above conjectures,
the denominator is n−r instead of n. This is due to assuming
that we do not download anything from the nonresponsive
serves (e.g., the request is dropped after a certain waiting
time). For simplicity, here we assume that we download from
all the servers, but the results similarly hold for n− r.
Conjecture 3 ( [12], Conjecture 1). Let C be an [n, k, d]
code with a generator matrix GC that stores m files via the
distributed storage system Y = XGC , and fix 1 ≤ t ≤ n− k.
Any PIR scheme for Y that protects against any t colluding
servers has rate at most Rm,
Rm ≤
1− k+t−1
n
1− (k+t−1
n
)m
m→∞
−→ 1−
k + t− 1
n
.
However, Conjecture 3 in its full extent was disproved in
[17], where the authors exhibited an explicit PIR scheme for
m = 2 files distributed over n = 4 servers using a rate 1/2
storage code, which protects against t = 2 collusion. The
exhibited scheme has rate 3/5, while the conjectured capacity
was 4/7. The proposed query scheme is not symbol-separated,
see Def. 2 and [17, Sec. 3.3]. Hence, the counter-example does
not violate the results in this paper.
We refine the conjecture here and state it as Theorem 1 for
MDS-coded, linear, symbol-separated PIR. The proof can be
found in Sec. IV-A. We will show later in Sec. V, Thm. 3,
that the asymptotic capacity expression holds for any strongly-
linear PIR scheme regardless of the number of files, under the
assumption that all servers respond and their responses have
the same size.
Theorem 1. The capacity of linear, symbol-separated PIR
from (n, k) MDS-coded storage with t colluding nodes, where
all nodes are honest and responsive, is given by
C
(n,k)−MDS
TPIR =
1− k+t−1
n
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m .
Remark 2. We would like to emphasize that these schemes
form a very relevant and practical case, namely the respective
capacity result is known to be achievable [12], [13] by a small
field size q ≥ n, which is that of a generalized Reed–Solomon
code. Moreover, the subpacketization level is independent of
m and is (at most) quadratic in n [12, Eq. (17)]. This is
in contrast to the schemes in [2]–[4], [18], where each file
is assumed to be subdivided into a number of packets that
grows exponentially with the number of files m. It was shown
in [18] that an exponential (in m) number of packets per file
was necessary for a PIR scheme with optimal download rate,
under the assumption that all servers respond to the queries
and the responses have the same size. In [19] a scheme was
presented that achieves the capacity with only O(n) packets
by making a weaker assumption on the size of the responses
than in [18].
In Section VI we prove the capacity of MDS-coded, sym-
metric PIR with colluding, byzantine, and non-responsive
servers, as stated in Conjecture 2, for some specific distri-
butions of the randomness shared by the servers (for rigorous
definitions and known results see Section VI).
Finally, in Section VII, we give a condition on the param-
eters based on the results of [20] for which the asymptotic
3regime is reached, under some assumptions on the alphabet
used for download.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND KNOWN RESULTS
We consider a distributed storage system with n nodes
(servers) storing m files X i ∈ Fα×k with an (n, k) MDS
storage code, i.e., node j stores the jth column of
Y = X ·G =


X1
X2
...
Xm

 ·G =


Y 11 Y
1
2 · · · Y
1
n
Y 21 Y
2
2 · · · Y
2
n
...
...
. . .
...
Y m1 Y
m
2 · · · Y
m
n

 ,
where G is a generator matrix of the storage code. We denote
by Y l = X lG the encoded version of the lth file. We think
of α as the number of stripes of each file, and each stripe
is encoded independently of other stripes. The m files are
independent and each consists of k i.i.d. randomly drawn
symbols from Fαq , i.e., for the entropies it holds that
H(X i) = kα log q, ∀ i ∈ [m]
H(X1, . . . , Xm) = mkα log q .
We consider MDS codes, so every k nodes exactly recover the
file, i.e., for any set W ⊂ [n] with |W| = k it holds that
H(YW) = H(X
1, . . . , Xm) = mkα log q
H(X1, . . . , Xm|YW) = 0 .
We also assume that the servers have access to a shared source
of randomness. Formally, let S be a vector space over F, and
let
S = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ S
n
be a random vector, where the symbols of Sj may be used by
the jth server. For vector spaces A,B, we use Hom(A,B) to
denote the set of all linear maps from A to B.
In a general PIR scheme, a user desiring the file with index
i picks the corresponding query
Qi =
(
Qi1, . . . , Q
i
n
)
from the set of all possible queries Q, and sends Qij to the
jth node. Every node returns a response Aij that is an β-tuple
of symbols in F. For a non-adversarial node, this response
depends on the query Qij , the symbols Yj stored at node j,
and the randomness S shared by the nodes, in a way known
to the user. The list of responses from all nodes for a given
query is denoted by
Ai =
(
Ai1, . . . , A
i
n
)
.
The desired file X i should now be recoverable from the
responses, meaning that
H(X i|Qi, Ai) = 0. (1)
In this work we only consider PIR schemes in which the
query functions are linear.
Definition 1 (Linear PIR). A PIR scheme is linear if the
queries
Qij ∈ Hom(F
αm × S;Fβ).
In other words, we can represent Qij by an β-tuple of vectors
Qij [ℓ] ∈ F
αm, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ β,
and the responses are given by
Aij [ℓ] =
〈
Qij[ℓ], Yj
〉
+ Sj [ℓ] ,
where Sj[ℓ] depends on the randomness S shared by the nodes.
In the case of non-symmetric PIR, the nodes do not need to
share any randomness from the user, so we may assume that
Sj [ℓ] = 0 for all j ∈ [n], ℓ ∈ [β].
It is customary to think of the β coordinates of the queries
Qij as iterations. In this terminology, a linear PIR scheme
consists of β iterations, where in iteration ℓ the user sends n
query column vectors
Qij [ℓ] ∈ F
αm, j ∈ [n],
and receives a response row vector
Ai[ℓ] ∈ Fn.
From this viewpoint, it is natural to make the following def-
inition, describing the case when the queries sent in different
iterations can be allowed to be statistically independent of each
other.
Definition 2 (Symbol-Separated PIR). A linear PIR scheme
is symbol-separated if for each i ∈ [m] there is an β-tuple of
probability spaces
Qi[1], . . . ,Qi[β]
such that:
• Each Qi[ℓ] ∈ Qi[ℓ] is an n-tuple of query vectors
Qij[ℓ] ∈ Hom(F
αm × S;F).
• For every
(Q[1], . . . , Q[β]) ∈ Qi[1]× · · · × Qi[β],
the desired file X i is a deterministic function of
A = (Aj [ℓ])j∈[n],ℓ∈[β] ,
where
Aj [ℓ] = Q[ℓ](Yj , S),
where S is the shared randomness.
Most PIR schemes in the literature are indeed symbol-
separated, including those in [11], [12], [14]. A notable
example of a scheme that is not symbol-separated is that
in [17].
In general, the goal of information-theoretic private infor-
mation retrieval with t-collusion is for the user to retrieve a
file such that any set of t storage nodes learns nothing about
the index of the desired file. This is referred to as user privacy.
Definition 3 (User Privacy with t-Collusion). Any t colluding
nodes shall not be able to obtain any information about the
index of the requested file, i.e., the mutual information
I(i;QiT , A
i
T , YT , S) = 0, ∀ T ⊂ [n], |T | = t . (2)
4We will also consider symmetric PIR (SPIR), where the user
is not supposed to learn any information about the files other
than the requested one.
Definition 4 (Server Privacy). The user shall learn no infor-
mation about files other than the requested one, i.e.,
I(X [m]\i;Ai[n],Q, i) = 0 . (3)
A scheme that satisfies (1) and (2) is called a PIR scheme.
If the scheme in addition satisfies (3), then it is called an
SPIR scheme. We are interested in the capacities of linear
PIR and SPIR with collusion and adversaries, i.e., the highest
achievable rate at which a desired file can be retrieved under
these constraints.
Definition 5 ((S)PIR Rate and Capacity). The rate of an
(S)PIR scheme is the number of information bits of the
requested file retrieved per downloaded answer bits, i.e.,
R(S)PIR =
H(X i)∑n
j=1H(A
i
j)
.
The (S)PIR capacity is the supremum of (S)PIR rates of (S)PIR
schemes, for fixed values of n, k, t, b, r.
In order to achieve symmetric privacy, the nodes require
some amount of shared randomness.
Definition 6 (Secrecy Rate). The secrecy rate is the amount
of common randomness shared by the storage nodes relative
to the file size, i.e.,
ρSPIR =
H(S)
H(X i)
.
We give some results closely related to the ones presented
in this work.
Theorem 2 (Capacity of TSPIR [8, Theorem 1] and TB-
SPIR [7, Theorem 1]). For linear symmetric private infor-
mation retrieval from a set of m ≥ 2 files stored on n servers
with an (n, k) MDS code (for replication k = 1), where any
t nodes may collude, the capacity is
C
(n,k)−MDS
TSPIR =
{
1− k+t−1
n
, if ρ
(n,k)−MDS
TSPIR ≥
k+t−1
n−k−t+1
0, otherwise
.
For symmetric private information retrieval from a set of m ≥
2 files replicated on n servers, where any t nodes may collude
and any b nodes are Byzantine, the capacity is
C
[n,1]−MDS
TBSPIR =
{
1− 2b+t
n
, if ρTBSPIR ≥
t
n−t−2b
0, otherwise
.
It is known that when t = 1 or k = 1, the above SPIR
capacity coincides with the asymptotic capacity of PIR with
no server privacy [3], [4]. Motivated by this, our aim is to
prove that this is the case more generally. Namely, we will
prove Conjectures 2 and 3 for MDS-coded linear PIR, and
then proceed to provide a proof in the case of strongly-linear
schemes (cf. Def. 7) for Conjecture 1, further extending the
conjectured asymptotic capacity to the non-asymptotic regime
in this special case.
In our proofs, we will repeatedly use Han’s inequality for
joint entropies [21], which we state here for completeness. Let
Z1, . . . Zn be random variables defined on the same probability
space, and let ZT = (Zi : i ∈ T ) for T ⊆ [n]. Denote by(
[n]
k
)
the set of all subsets of [n] with cardinality k. Then
H(Z1, . . . Zn) ≤
1(
n
k
) ∑
T ∈([n]
k
)
H(ZT ). (4)
III. PRELIMINARY LEMMAS
We begin by introducing some intermediate lemmas which
will be required in both Section IV and Section VI. Our proofs
of linear symbol-separated MDS-TPIR in Section IV and
MDS-TBSPIR capacity in Section VI are partly based on the
proofs of TBSPIR capacity in a replicated setting [7] as well as
the proofs of SPIR capacity [9] and TSPIR capacity [8] from
MDS-coded storage. We first prove the intermediate results for
a set of nodes that is free of adversaries and then, similar to [7],
argue that the entropy of the adversarial responses has to be
the same as for non-adversarial nodes to obtain the capacity.
For completeness, the proofs of the intermediate steps are
included, though for some the proofs can be taken directly
from [8] and [7].
Similar to the replicated case in [7, Lemma 6], in the fol-
lowing we argue that when considering zero error probability,
i.e., guaranteeing that the user can decode if the number of
corrupted answers is ≤ b and the number of nonresponsive
nodes is ≤ r, every realization of n−2b−r authentic answers
has to be unique.
Lemma 1. In an optimal scheme with zero error probability
for b adversarial and r nonresponsive nodes it holds that
H(X i|AiH,Q) = 0 ,
for any set H of honest nodes with |H| ≥ n− 2b− r.
Proof. Assume that for a set R ⊂ [n] with |R| = r of
nonresponsive nodes and a set H ⊂ [n] \ R of honest nodes
with |H| = n−2b−r it holds that AiH(X
i) = AiH(X˜
i) for two
different realizations X i and X˜ i of file i. Suppose the answers
of n− r responsive nodes are given by AiH(X
i) = AiH(X˜
i),
AiB1(X
i) and AiB2(X˜
i), where B1 ∪ B2 = [n] \ (R ∪H) and
|B1| = |B2| = b. Then a user would not be able to differentiate
between the answers for the two realizations, where B1 is the
set of adversaries if X˜ i is the correct realization and vice versa.
Hence the unique decoding would fail, thereby violating the
zero error probability requirement.
The following basic lemma will also be required in multiple
proofs and applies to both the symmetric and non-symmetric
setting.
Lemma 2. For any set N ⊂ [n] of non-adversarial nodes
H(AiN |Q, X
i, QiN ) = H(A
i
N |X
i, QiN ).
Proof. We first show that I(AiN ;Q|X
i, QiN ) ≤ 0, as follows
I(AiN ;Q|X
i, QiN ) ≤ I(A
i
N , X
[m], S;Q|X i, QiN )
(a)
= I(X [m], S;Q|X i, QiN )
≤ I(X [m], S;Q) = 0,
5where (a) follows because the answers AiN are a function of
the queries QiN , the files X
[m], and the shared randomness S
(for the non-symmetric case S can be thought of as a constant,
e.g., S = 0). As mutual information is non-negative, it follows
that
I(AiN ;Q|X
i, QiN ) =H(A
i
N |X
i, QiN )
−H(AiN |Q, X
i, QiN ) = 0
⇒ H(AiN |X
i, QiN ) =H(A
i
N |Q, X
i, QiN ) .
IV. PROOF OF LINEAR SYMBOL-SEPARATED MDS-TPIR
CAPACITY
A. Converse
Through a novel formulation of the key Lemma 4, which is
slightly stronger than the corresponding lemmas in [8], [9],
these techniques also allow us to induct over the number
of files. This induction over files applies also without the
symmetry assumption, and proves the MDS-TPIR capacity for
linear symbol-separated schemes. The same proof also yields
an upper bound for the capacity in the presence of adversarial
servers. However, the upper bound for MDS-TBPIR does not
correspond to any known scheme constructions, and does not
even agree with the MDS-TBSPIR capacity asymptotically as
the number of files grows to infinity.
The following lemma, which is key to our capacity bounds,
describes how sets of as many as k + t − 1 servers will
give responses that are independent of the desired file. The
interesting case of the lemma is when i ∈ F , i′ 6∈ F .
Lemma 3. Let N ⊂ [n] be a set of non-adversarial nodes
with |N | = k+ t− 1, and let F ( [αm] be any proper subset
of the rows of the MDS-coded storage system. For any optimal
symbol-separated linear PIR scheme, and any i, i′ ∈ [m], it
holds that1
H(AiN |X
F , QiN ) = H(A
i′
N |X
F , Qi
′
N ) . (5)
Proof. For a symbol-separated scheme, the entropies on either
side of (5) can be written as sums over the iterations. Hence, it
is enough to prove that (5) holds whenQj ∈ Hom(Fαm×S,F)
and Aj ∈ F for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Without loss of generality assume that N = [k+ t−1]. The
conditional entropies can be decomposed as
H(AiN |X
F , QiN ) =
k−1∑
j=1
H(Aij |X
F , QiN , A
i
1,...,j−1)
+H(Aik,...k+t−1|X
F , QiN , A
i
1,...,k−1),
1A proper formulation of this should read that,
E(H(AiN |X
F , QiN = q)) = E(H(A
i
′
N |X
F , Qi
′
N = q)),
where the expectation is over Q. Indeed, there are q,q′ such that
H(AiN |X
F , QiN = q) 6= H(A
i
′
N |X
F , Qi
′
N = q
′) .
We will follow the common notation that does not explicitly state the
expectations for the ease of notation.
and so it is enough to prove that
H(Aij |X
F , QiN , A
i
1,...,j−1) = H(A
i′
j |X
F , Qi
′
N , A
i′
1,...,j−1)
(6)
for j = 1, . . . , k − 1 and that
H(AiT |X
F , QiN , A
i
1,...,k−1) = H(A
i′
T |X
F , Qi
′
N , A
i′
1,...,k−1),
(7)
where T = {k, . . . , k + t− 1}.
By linearity, Aij = 〈Q
i
j , Yj〉 + Sj , where Sj is a random
variable that is independent of X . In an optimal scheme,
this randomness S is statistically independent of the answers
(see [8, Lemma 3]), as it would otherwise be possible to
reduce the entropy of the answers without violating the privacy
constraints. By the privacy constraint for single servers,
Prob(Qij = q) = Prob(Q
i′
j = q)
for any j.
If j ≤ k, then Y
[αm]\F
j is independent of (Y1,...,j−1, X
F),
and so it is also independent of Ai1,...,j−1. Thus for any fixed
q ∈ Fαm, 〈q, Yj〉 + Sj has a distribution that is independent
of Ai1,...,j−1. This proves (6).
Now for any fixed values of Y1,...k−1, X
F , and for any
j ∈ T , Y
[αm]\F
j is uniformly distributed over F
αm−|F| by
the MDS property of the code. For qj ∈ Fαm, j ∈ T , we
distinguish two cases. If qj is only supported on F ⊆ [αm]
the inner product 〈qj , Yj〉 is constant and the distribution of
Aij = 〈qj , Yj〉 + Sj only depends on Sj . If q has support
outside of F , Aij is uniformly distributed over F. Either way,
the entropy
H(AiT |Q
i
T = qT )
is independent of (XF , QiN\T , A
i
1,...,k−1). Since |T | = t, by
the privacy constraint we have
Prob(QiT = qT ) = Prob(Q
i′
T = qT ).
We thus have
H(AiT |X
F , QiN , A
i
1,...,k−1)
=H(AiT |, Q
i
T ) = H(A
i′
T |, Q
i′
T )
=H(Ai
′
T |X
F , Qi
′
N , A
i′
1,...,k−1),
which proves (7).
The following lemma will be used to prove the upper bounds
on the non-symmetric MDS-TPIR capacity.
Lemma 4. Consider an optimal linear (S)PIR scheme, and let
H ⊂ [n] be a minimal set (set of smallest possible cardinality)
such that
H(X i|AiH,Q) = 0.
For s = 1, . . . ,m, let
hs =
n
|H|
H(AsH|Q,X
1,...,s−1).
Then, for all s = 1, . . . ,m,
hs ≥
n
n− 2b− r
(
H(Xs) +
k + t− 1
n
hs+1
)
.
6Proof. By Lemma 1, |H| ≤ n−2b−r. By Han’s inequality (4),
the average value of H(As+1N |Q,X
1,...,s) over all sets N ⊆ H
with |N | = k + t− 1 is at least
k + t− 1
|H|
H(As+1H |Q,X
1,...,s).
We can thus choose a set N ⊆ H with |N | = k + t− 1 such
that
H(As+1N |Q,X
1,...,s) ≥
k + t− 1
|H|
H(As+1H |Q,X
1,...,s)
=
k + t− 1
n
hs+1 .
By independence of the files and the queries, we have
H(Xs|Q,X1,...,s−1) = H(Xs).
We thus get
hs =
n
|H|
H(AsH|Q,X
1,...,s−1)
=
n
|H|
(
H(Xs) +H(AsH|Q,X
1,...,s)
)
≥
n
|H|
(
H(Xs) +H(AsN |Q,X
1,...,s)
)
Lemma 3
=
n
|H|
(
H(Xs) +H(As+1N |Q,X
1,...,s)
)
≥
n
|H|
(
H(Xs) +
k + t− 1
n
hs+1
)
≥
n
n− 2b− r
(
H(Xs) +
k + t− 1
n
hs+1
)
.
Setting b = r = 0, we are now ready to prove the capacity
of MDS-TPIR. We restate Theorem 1 is included again here
for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 1. The capacity of linear, symbol-separated PIR
from (n, k) MDS-coded storage with t colluding nodes, where
all nodes are honest and responsive, is given by
C
(n,k)−MDS
TPIR =
1− k+t−1
n
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m .
Proof. Achievability: An explicit scheme achieving the rate
is constructed in [15] by “lifting” the star-product scheme in
[12].
Converse: Let H ⊂ [n] be a minimal set such that
H(X i|AiH,Q) = 0,
and for s = 1, . . . ,m, let
hs =
n
|H|
H(AsH|Q,X
1,...,s−1)
as in Lemma 4. Denote the size H(X i), which is equal for
all files, by L. By definition and Lemma 2, the rate R of the
scheme satisfies
1
R
=
∑
j∈[n]H(A
s
j)
L
≥
∑
j∈[n]H(A
s
j |Q)
L
≥
h1
L
,
where the last equation follows by minimality of H. It is thus
enough to show that
hs
L
≥
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m−s+1
1− k+t−1
n
(8)
holds for all 1 ≤ s ≤ m. We will prove this by backwards
induction on s.
When s = m, (8) just says that hs ≥ L, which is immediate
from the correctness of the scheme and the independence of
the files. Now assume as an induction hypothesis that
hs′
L
≥
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m−s′+1
1− k+t−1
n
,
and let s = s′ − 1 Then Lemma 4 yields
hs
L
≥ 1 +
(
k + t− 1
n
hs′
L
)
≥ 1 +
k+t−1
n
−
(
k+t−1
n
)m−s′+2
1− k+t−1
n
=
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m−s+1
1− k+t−1
n
.
This proves (8) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ m by induction. The case
s = 1 is the statement of the theorem.
Remark 3. By similar techniques, we get an upper bound
C
(n,k)−MDS
TBPIR ≤
(
1−
2b+ r
n
)
·
1− k+t−1
n
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m (9)
for the case where we also have Byzantine and nonresponsive
servers. However, we believe this to be a loose upper bound.
If the bound (9) were to be tight, the next result would show
that symmetric PIR has a strictly lower capacity than PIR
even as the number of files goes to infinity. This would be in
sharp contrast to the case where there are no Byzantine and
nonresponsive servers.
V. STRONGLY-LINEAR PIR CAPACITY
We have seen that, for a symmetric linear scheme, the rate
cannot be larger than that obtained by a star-product scheme
in [13], regardless of the number of files. Further, Theorem 1
shows that as the number of files grows, the rate of the star
product scheme in [12] approaches capacity. We will now
show that, under stronger linearity assumptions, this is also
true for a finite number of files and without assuming server
privacy. In essence, we define a strongly linear PIR scheme
to be one where all interference cancellation is linear and
deterministic. This is a highly natural assumption, but it is
not true for schemes such as those in [3], [4], which do not
satisfy Definition 7 below.
Definition 7 (Strongly Linear PIR). We say that a linear PIR
scheme is strongly linear if each symbol of the desired file
is obtained as a deterministic linear function over F of the
response vector
(Ai1, . . . , A
i
n),
7that is, the reconstruction function does not depend on the
randomness used to produce the queries.
Remark 4. Note that a symbol-separated scheme does not
have to be strongly linear. However, an optimal strongly linear
scheme can always be chosen to be a star product scheme
without loss in the rate, and hence is symbol separated.
For the results in this section, we need to recall a notion
that is central to much recent work on PIR. If c = (c1, . . . , cn)
and d = (d1, . . . , dn) are two words of the same length over
the same field, then their coordinate-wise product is denoted
c ⋆ d = (c1d1, . . . , cndn).
Let C andD be two codes of length n over F. The star product
C ⋆D is the linear span of the codewords c ⋆ d, where c ∈ C,
d ∈ D. Note that this definition does not require that the codes
C and D are linear, but it always yields a linear code C ⋆ D
as the star product.
Lemma 5. Consider a strongly linear PIR scheme from a
linear storage code C. For j = 1, . . . ,m, let Di,j ⊆ Fn be the
linear span of the row vectors (q1, . . . , qn) that can occur as
the jth row of a query matrix Qi. Then the rate of the PIR
scheme is at most
1−
dim(C ⋆ (
∑
j 6=i D
i,j))
dim(C ⋆ (
∑
j D
i,j))
.
If the strongly linear PIR scheme downloads equally much
from all servers, then the rate is at most
dim(C ⋆ (
∑
j D
i,j))− dim(C ⋆ (
∑
j 6=i D
i,j))
n
.
Proof. For linear PIR schemes, i.e., schemes where Aj =
〈Qj, Yj〉, the answers can be described as the sum of the star
product (i.e., Hadamard product) of rows of the query matrix
and rows of the storage by
A = (〈Q1, Y1〉 , 〈Q2, Y2〉 , . . . , 〈Qn, Yn〉)
=
m∑
l=1
Q(l) ⋆ Y l
∈
m∑
l=1
Di,l ⋆ C ,
where Q(l) denotes the lth row of the query matrix and Y l =
X lG is the encoded version of the lth file.
Let
Φ : A 7→ X iI
be the deterministic map that returns the coordinates {X ij : j ∈
I} of the desired file. Then for each l 6= i, Φ must be constant
on each coset of Di,l⋆C, because otherwise changing the query
matrix and the lth file would affect the value of Φ(A). Since
this holds for every l 6= i, Φ must be constant on each coset
of
∑
j 6=iD
i,j ⋆ C, so
|I| ≤ dim

∑
j
Di,j ⋆ C

− dim

∑
j 6=i
Di,j ⋆ C

 .
The answer A can be reconstructed from the responses of
dim
(∑
j D
i,j ⋆ C
)
servers, or from n servers if we require to
download equally much from each server. Dividing the number
|I| of downloaded q-ary symbols from the desired file by the
number of q-ary symbols in A, we get the claimed bounds on
the PIR rate. This concludes the proof.
For the rest of the paper, we assume downloading the same
number of symbols from all the servers for simplicity. We
are now ready to show that any strongly linear scheme can be
replaced by a star product scheme for the same privacy model,
without losing in the PIR rate.
Theorem 3 (Capacity of Strongly Linear PIR). Consider a
strongly linear PIR scheme from an (n, k) storage code C,
with b Byzantine and r non responsive nodes, that protects
against t-collusion. Its PIR capacity is
C
(n,k)−MDS
TBPIR = 1−
k + t+ 2b+ r − 1
n
for any number of files.
Proof. Let Q denote the query matrix and let Di,l be as in
Lemma 5 for l 6= i. Define D =
∑
l 6=iD
i,l and let
δ = dim(
∑
l
Di,l)− dim(
∑
l 6=i
Di,l) .
Then there is a coset [e] of D in
∑
lD
i,l = D+Di,i that has
minimal weight δ. Let e ∈ Fn be a weight δ element of this
coset.
Now the (D, e) star product scheme, as defined in [12], has
a set of feasible query matrices that is more restrictive in the
row of the desired file, but less restrictive in the rows of the
unwanted files, than the original strongly linear scheme. Thus,
whatever privacy constraints were satisfied by the original
scheme, is also respected by the (D, e) star product scheme.
Moreover, by construction the rate of the star product scheme
is
1−
dim(D)
dim(
∑
lD
i,l)
,
which is at least the rate of the original strongly linear scheme
by Lemma 5. So the rate of any strongly linear scheme is
bounded from above by the rate of a star product scheme
with the same privacy constraints, which is in turn bounded
by 1− k+2b+r+t−1
n
as shown in [13]. The paper also presents
an achievable scheme via the star product construction.
Note that the capacity of strongly linear PIR is independent
of the number of files. Hence, the above theorem also yields
a proof for Conjectures 1 and 4 in the strongly-linear case.
Remark 5. The proof of the above theorem shows that,
among strongly-linear schemes, the star product scheme [12],
[13] is optimal. Here, we have assumed that all the servers
respond with equal size responses. However, by loosening this
assumption, improvements for finite m are possible, along the
same lines as in [19].
8VI. CAPACITY OF MDS-CODED TBSPIR FOR SCHEMES
WITH ADDITIVE RANDOMNESS
In this section we prove the capacity of MDS-coded TB-
SPIR for the specific system models considered in [14]. Recent
works [14], [22] have shown that it is crucial to consider
the distribution of the randomness shared by the nodes when
deriving the capacity of such systems. We begin by shortly
reviewing the results presented in these works. In [22] the
authors derive the capacity of MDS-coded SPIR with mis-
matched randomness, meaning that they assume the complete
randomness to be available to all nodes. It is shown that this
assumption of sharing the complete randomness among the
nodes leads to a strictly larger rate than when the randomness
is also coded with the same MDS code as the storage. The
resulting capacity approaches the capacity of coded, matched
SPIR when the number of files tends to infinity and is always
strictly lower than the coded PIR capacity.
In [14] the authors derive the capacity of MDS-coded
SPIR with and without collusion for the case of matched
randomness, i.e., where the randomness is also encoded with
the storage code. Further, they consider the special case of
schemes with additive randomness independent of the queries.
Specifically, the authors show
• the capacity of (n, k) MDS-coded storage, where for any
k nodes the randomness is independent, to be
Cmatched MDS-SPIR = 1−
k
n
.
• the capacity of uncoded, i.e., k = 1, SPIR with collusion
of any t nodes (TSPIR) to be
CTSPIR = 1−
t
n
.
• The capacity of MDS-coded TSPIR, for schemes where
the nodes add the randomness to the responses and the
randomness is independent of the queries to be
Cadd. MDS-TSPIR = 1−
k + t− 1
n
.
In this section we consider the extension of the results
from [14] to the MDS-TBSPIR setting, i.e., to symmetric PIR
from coded databases protecting against a number of byzantine
servers b and a number of unresponsive servers r.
Definition 8 (Matched SBPIR [14]). We say an BSPIR scheme
is matched if the randomness is independent for every subset
of k nodes.
Definition 9 (Additive randomness TBSPIR [14]). We define
a scheme to be an additive randomness TBSPIR scheme if the
queries are of the form
Aij = fj(Q
i
j , Yj) + Sj
where Sj is independent of the received query Q
i
j .
Lemma 6. For any MDS-TBSPIR scheme and for any set of
non-adversarial nodes N ⊂ [n] with |N | = k+ t− 1 it holds
that
H(AiN |X
i, QiN ) = H(A
i
N |Q
i
N ) ,
if the randomness is additive as in Definition 9 or t = 1.
Proof. The proof for the case of additive randomness follows
directly from the proof of [14, Lemma 8], as it is independent
of the total number of nodes and we restrict the Lemma to
non-adversarial nodes. For the same reasons the proof of [14,
Lemma 7] also applies here for the case of t = 1.
Theorem 4. The capacity of linear symmetric PIR from [n, k]
MDS-coded storage with b adversarial, r nonresponsive and
t colluding nodes is given by
1−
k + t+ 2b+ r − 1
n
,
if the randomness is additive as defined in Definition 9 or for
t = 1 as in Definition 8.
Proof. Let H ⊂ [n] and N ⊂ H be sets of honest, responsive
nodes with |H| = n− 2b− r and |N | = k + t− 1. Then
H(X i)
(a)
= H(X i|Q)
(b)
= H(X i|Q)−H(X i|AiH,Q)
= I(X i;AiH|Q)
= H(AiH|Q)−H(A
i
H|X
i,Q)
(c)
≤ H(AiH|Q)−H(A
i
N |X
i,Q, QiN )
(d)
= H(AiH|Q)−H(A
i
N |X
i, QiN )
(e)
= H(AiH|Q)−H(A
i
N |Q
i
N )
≤ H(AiH|Q)−H(A
i
N |Q) ,
Equality (a) holds because the files are independent of the
queries, (b) holds by Lemma 1, (c) holds because N ⊂ H,
(d) holds by Lemma 2, and (e) holds by Lemma 6.
Averaging over all sets N gives
H(X i) ≤ H(AiH|Q)−
1(
n−2b−r
k+t−1
) ∑
N⊂H
|N|=k+t−1
H(AiN |Q).
Han’s inequality (c.f. Equation (4)) gives
1(
n−2b−r
k+t−1
) ∑
N⊂H
|N|=k+t−1
H(AiN |Q) ≥
k + t− 1
n− 2b− r
H(AiH|Q).
Hence, for some h ∈ H it holds that
H(X i) ≤ H(AiH|Q)−
k + t− 1
n− 2b− r
H(AiH|Q)
=
n− k − 2b− r − t+ 1
n− 2b− r
H(AiH|Q)
≤
n− k − 2b− r − t+ 1
n− 2b− r
(n− 2b− r)H(Aih|Q) .
Assuming that the answers of the adversarial nodes are of
the same entropy as the non-adversarial answers, since the
adversaries could otherwise be easily identified, gives
H(X i)∑n
j=1H(A
i
j)
=
H(X i)
n ·H(Aih|Q)
(10)
≤
H(X i)
n
·
n− k − 2b− r − t+ 1
H(X i)
=
n− k − 2b− r − t+ 1
n
.
9Achievability: The symmetric version of the scheme intro-
duced in [13], which generalizes the scheme of [12], achieves
the presented upper bound on the PIR rate. Note that this
scheme fulfills both Definition 8 and Definition 9, since the
symmetry is achieved by adding a random codeword from the
(n, k) MDS storage code to the answers.
Note that we include the nonresponsive servers in the
calculation of the download cost, which is debatable, due to
the reasonable argument that nonresponsive servers do not
contribute to this cost. However, this depends on the particular
system as, e.g., dropped packets on the side of the user could
also cause a missing response, while clearly causing network
traffic. Therefore we include the nonresponsive servers in the
download cost, but note that this can be modified by changing
the upper limit of the sum in (10) to n− r.
Finally, we derive the secrecy rate of TBSPIR by combining
the proofs of [8, Theorem 7] and [7, Theorem 1]
Theorem 5. The secrecy rate of a linear TBSPIR scheme from
an (n, k) MDS-coded storage system fulfills
ρ ≥
k + t− 1
n− k − t− 2b− r + 1
,
if the randomness is additive as in Definition 9 or t = 1.
Proof. Let H ⊂ [n] and N ⊂ H be sets of honest, responsive
nodes with |H| = n − 2b − r and |N | = k + t − 1. First,
observe that
H(AiH|Q) = H(X
i) +H(AiH|X
i, Q)
≥ H(X i) +H(AiN |X
i, Q)
≥ H(X i) +H(AiN |Q).
Averaging over all sets N ⊂ H with |N | = k + t− 1 we get
H(AiH|Q) ≥ H(X
i) +
k + t− 1
n− 2b− r
H(AiH|Q). (11)
Let H ⊂ [n] and N ⊂ H be sets of honest, responsive nodes
with |H| = n−2b− r and |N | = k+ t−1. By server privacy,
0 = I(X [m]\i;AH|Q)
= H(X [m]\i|Q)−H(X [m]\i|AiH,Q)
= H(X [m]\i|X i,Q)−H(X [m]\i|AiH, X
i,Q)
= I(X [m]\i;AiH|Q, X
i)
≥ I(X [m]\i;AiN |Q, X
i)
= H(AiN |X
i,Q)−H(AiN |X
[m],Q) +H(AiN |S,X
[m],Q)
= H(AiN |X
i,Q)− I(S;AiN |X
[m],Q)
≥ H(AiN |X
i, QiN ,Q)−H(S)
= H(AiN |Q
i
N )−H(S)
≥ H(AiN |Q)−H(S) .
Averaging over all sets N , we get by (11) that
H(S) ≥
1(
n−2b−r
k+t−1
) ∑
N⊂H
|N|=k+t−1
H(AiN |Q)
≥
k + t− 1
n− 2b− r
H(AiH|Q)
≥
k + t− 1
n− k − t− 2b− r + 1
H(X i) ,
The bound on the secrecy rate follows by
ρ =
H(S)
H(X i)
≥
k + t− 1
n− k − t− 2b− r + 1
.
VII. OPTIMALITY OF THE STAR-PRODUCT SCHEME FOR
SOME PARAMETERS
A. Replicated, no Collusion/Adversaries
In the previous sections we derived the capacity for some
specific settings. In the case of linear, symbol-separated MDS-
TPIR, as considered in Section IV, this capacity depends on
the number of files in the system, similar to the capacity in
the known settings of PIR from replicated storage [2], MDS-
PIR [3], and TPIR [4]. For a finite number of files, the rate of
PIR schemes in these settings can be increased compared to
the asymptotic (as the number of files m → ∞) capacity, as
restated in Table I. However, whether this improvement can
actually be realized depends on the level of subpacketization
L = αk, i.e., the number of symbols in a file, the size of the
alphabet on which the PIR scheme operates, and the size of
the alphabet used for transmission2.
The following results are based on the results for binary
schemes in [23], where it was proved that if L ≤ n − 1, the
optimal download is L+ 1 bits. Now consider a scheme over
a q-ary alphabet and transmission using a q′-ary alphabet. In
[20] the results of [23] were generalized to arbitrary alphabets,
by including conditions on the size of the alphabet used for
transmission of data to the user. For the case of mismatched
alphabets, i.e., q 6= q′, the optimal download cost is determined
up to a constant offset and for the case of matched alphabets,
i.e., q = q′, a complete characterization of the optimal
download cost is given. In particular, [20] shows that the result
on the optimal download of [23] is a special case of their
result, i.e., for a subpacketization of L ≤ n− 1 symbols of a
q-ary alphabet, the optimal download over a q-ary alphabet is
L+ 1 symbols.
Denote by DL the download cost for a given level of
subpacketization L, and define it as the maximum number
of symbols
DL = max
n∑
j=1
|Aij |M ′
of the transmission alphabet M ′ a user has to download for
any realization of the queries In [20] it was shown that the
2The download from each server is made up of an integer number of
symbols from the transmission alphabet.
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optimal download for PIR from n non-colluding databases,
each storing all m ≥ 2 files, for message size L is given by
DL =
⌈
L
C
⌉
, (12)
where C is the capacity of unrestrained PIR given by
C =
1− 1
n
1− 1
nm
.
We generalize this approach to the case of PIR from coded
databases and/or colluding servers. In Section IV the capacity
of linear, symbol-separated PIR was shown to be
C =
1− k+t−1
n
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m . (13)
Remark 6. This expression does not hold in full generality,
i.e., when not assuming linearity and symbol-separation, see
[17] for a counter-example for the case of m = 2 files.
However, it is the best rate for which a scheme for general
parameters is known, given by a applying the technique
presented in [15] to the PIR scheme of [12]. Further, note
that (13) includes both and the capacity for uncoded storage
(k = 1) with collusion (t ≥ 1) [4] and the capacity for coded
storage (k ≥ 1) without collusion (t = 1) [3] as special
cases, both of which are valid in general. Hence using this
expression provides some insight beyond the linear, symbol-
separated case.
It is easy to see that the proof of converse for (12) given
in [20, Section IV] for the case of matched alphabets (q =
q′) also applies in this setting. Our goal in the following is
not to characterize the optimal download cost, but instead to
determine the number of files required to reach the asymptotic
regime for a given set of parameters.
Consider a scheme that achieves the asymptotic capacity
(cf. Table I), such as , e.g., the star-product PIR scheme [12].
Such a PIR scheme can obtain n− k − t+ 1 symbols of the
desired file by downloading n symbols, one from each server.
Assume a subpacketization of
L = δ(n− k − t+ 1) .
A file can be obtained privately by applying this PIR scheme
δ times, downloading a total of δn symbols For the optimal
download cost for linear, symbol-separated PIR (cf. Remark 6
for motivation of using this expression) we obtain
DL =
⌈
L
C
⌉
=


δ(n− k − t+ 1)
(1− k+t−1
n
)
(
1−
(
k+t−1
n
)m)−1


=
⌈
δn
(
1−
(
k + t− 1
n
)m)⌉
= δn−
⌊
δn
(
k + t− 1
n
)m⌋
.
Hence, in the linear, symbol separated setting and under the
assumption that the transmission alphabet equals the alphabet
of the PIR scheme, the asymptotic regime is reached when⌊
δn
(
k + t− 1
n
)m⌋
= 0
which is equivalent to
δ <
nm−1
(k + t− 1)m
,
or in terms of the number of files,
m >
logn+ log δ
logn− log(k + t− 1)
.
On the other hand, if the scheme has optimal rate, then only
k symbols have been downloaded from each stripe, so L is a
multiple of k. Thus we get
δ =
L
n− k − t+ 1
≥
k
gcd(n− k − t+ 1, k)
.
For example, for parameters n = 30, k = 15, t = 10, and
δ = 5 this condition if fulfilled for m ≥ 23 files.
For the simplest case of replicated storage (k = 1) and no
collusion (t = 1) this can be further simplified to show that
the asymptotic regime is reached when
δ < nm−1 .
Note that for the non-trivial settings of m ≥ 2 this is always
fulfilled if δ < n.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we defined the practical notions of symbol-
separated PIR and strongly linear PIR. We have proved the
capacity of linear symbol-separated PIR with MDS-coded and
colluding servers. The capacity of symmetric linear PIR with
MDS-coded, colluding, Byzantine, and nonresponsive servers
was proved for the case of matched randomness.
The results take a significant step towards the general proof
for MDS-coded and colluded PIR capacity. Furthermore, they
bear high practical interest in that strong linearity allows for
small field sizes and low sub-packetization levels, making
implementation of the schemes much simpler.
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